This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We show that in zero-sum games, the only stable attractors of the Stackelberg gradient dynamics are Stackelberg equilibria. This insight allows us to develop a gradient-based update for the leader that converges to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games and the set of stable attractors in general-sum games. We then consider a follower employing a gradient-play update rule instead of a best response strategy and propose a two-timescale algorithm with similar asymptotic convergence results. For this algorithm, we also provide finite-time high probability bounds for local convergence to a neighborhood of a stable Stackelberg equilibrium in general-sum games.
Introduction
Tools from game theory now play a prominent role in machine learning. The emerging coupling between the fields can be credited to the formulation of learning problems as interactions between competing algorithms and the desire to characterize the limiting behaviors of such strategic interactions. Indeed, game theory provides a systematic framework to model the strategic interactions found in modern machine learning problems.
A significant portion of the game theory literature concerns games of simultaneous play and equilibrium analysis. In simultaneous play games, each player reveals the strategy they have selected concurrently. The solution concept often adopted in non-cooperative simultaneous play games is the Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the joint strategy of the competitors so that no player can benefit from unilaterally deviating from this strategy.
The study of equilibrium gives rise to the question of when and why the observed play in a game can be expected to correspond to an equilibrium. A common explanation is that an equilibrium emerges as the long run outcome of a process in which players repeatedly play a game and compete for optimality over time [16] . Consequently, a fundamental question in the study of learning in games is the convergence behavior of interacting learning algorithms. It is often viewed as a desirable property of such algorithms to converge to a Nash equilibrium. For this reason, much of the work in this field is geared toward designing learning rules that converge to Nash equilibria in broad classes of games [16] . In the process of this endeavor, many negative results for algorithms and classes of games have been established that characterize the limits of what is achievable under this solution concept [6, 28, 30, 40] .
The classic objective of learning in games is now being widely embraced in the machine learning community. While not encompassing, the prevailing research areas epitomizing this phenomenon are adversarial training and multi-agent learning. A substantial amount of interest has been given to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17] . Finding Nash equilibria in GANs is a challenging and there is a surge of interest in developing principled training algorithms for this purpose [3, 19, 27, 29, 31, 32] . The majority of these works attempt to use second-order gradient information to speed-up convergence. In our work, we draw connections to this literature and believe that the problem we study gives an unexplored perspective that may provide valuable insights moving forward.
Seeking equilibria in multi-agent learning gained prominence much earlier than adversarial training. However, following initial works on this topic [18, 20, 25] , scrutiny was given to the solution concepts being considered [41] and the field cooled. Owing to the arising applications with interacting agents, problems of this form are being studied extensively again. There has also been a shift toward analyzing gradient-based learning rules and convergence analysis [3, 15, 24, 28, 43] .
The progress analyzing learning dynamics and seeking equilibria in games is promising, but the work has been narrowly focused on simultaneous play games and the Nash equilibrium solution concept. There are many problems exhibiting a hierarchical order of play between agents in a diverse set of fields. Examples include human-robot collaboration and interacting autonomous systems in artificial intelligence [14, 26, 33, 38] , incentive design and control [13, 35, 36] , and organizational structures in economics [2, 10] . In game theory, this type of game is known as a Stackelberg game and the solution concept studied is called a Stackelberg equilibrium.
In the simplest formulation of a Stackelberg game, there is a leader and a follower that interact in a hierarchical structure. The sequential order of play is such that the leader is endowed with the power to select an action to which the follower can then respond. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the follower plays a best response to the strategy of the leader and the leader uses this knowledge to its advantage when selecting a strategy. As we highlight in this paper, the ability of the leader to act before the follower can give the leader a distinct advantage.
In this paper, we study the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. Our motivation stems from the emergence of problems in which there is a distinct order of play between interacting learning agents and the lack of existing theoretical convergence guarantees in this domain. The rigorous study of the learning dynamics in Stackelberg games we provide also has implications for simultaneous play games relevant to adversarial training. The insights we discover come as a direct consequence of taking up a viewpoint deviating from that appearing in the resurgent literature on learning in games.
Contributions A novelty of our work is the exploration of a topic relevant to adversarial training and multi-agent learning that has not been sufficiently scrutinized. Before summarizing our contributions, we mention some exceptions of papers that have similar objectives in mind. The recent work of Jin et al. [21] proposes a local minmax equilibrium notion that is similar to the Stackelberg equilibrium notion we adopt. However, the results in that work do not bear a strong resemblance to ours since the problem is analyzed without noise and under constant step-sizes. It is also worth pointing out that the multi-agent learning papers of Foerster et al. [15] and Letcher et al. [24] do in some sense seek to give a player an advantage, but nevertheless focus on the Nash equilibrium concept in any analysis that is provided. The following is a summary of our contributions:
• We show that stable Nash equilibria are Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games. Moreover, there exist stable attractors of the gradient dynamics that are Stackelberg equilibria and not Nash equilibria.
• We demonstrate that the only stable attractors of the Stackelberg gradient dynamics are Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games. This allows us to define a gradient-based learning rule for the leader that converges to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games and the set of stable attractors in general-sum games.
• We consider the follower uses a gradient-play update rule instead of an exact best response strategy and propose a two-timescale algorithm to learn Stackelberg equilibria. We show almost sure asymptotic convergence to Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games and to stable attractors in general-sum games; a finite-time high probability bound for local convergence to a neighborhood of a stable Stackelberg equilibrium in general-sum games is also given. We present this paper with a single leader and a single follower, but this is only for ease of presentation. The extension to N followers that play in a staggered hierarchical structure or simultaneously is in Appendix C; equivalent results hold with some additional assumptions.
Organization. In Section 2, we formalize the problem we study and provide background material on Stackelberg games. We then draw connections between learning in Stackelberg games and existing work in zero-sum and general sum-games relevant to GANs and multi-agent learning, respectively. In Section 3, we give a rigorous convergence analysis of learning in Stackelberg games. Numerical examples are provided in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We leverage the rich theory of continuous games and dynamical systems in order to analyze algorithms implemented by agents interacting in a hierarchical game. In particular, each agent has an objective they want to selfishly optimize which depends on not only their actions but the actions of their competitor. However, there is an order of play in the sense that one player is the leader and the other player is the follower 1 . The leader then optimizes its objective with the knowledge that the follower will respond by selecting a best response. We refer to algorithms for learning in this setting as hierarchical learning algorithms. We specifically consider a class of learning algorithms in which the agents act myopically with respect to their given objective and role in the underlying hierarchical game by following the gradient of their objective with respect to their choice variable.
To concretize ideas, consider a game between two agents where one agent is deemed the leader and the other the follower. The leader has cost f 1 : X → R and the follower has cost f 2 : X → R, where X = X 1 × X 2 with the action space of the leader being X 1 and the action space of the follower being X 2 . The designation of 'leader' and 'follower' indicates the order of play between the two agents, meaning the leader plays first and the follower second. The leader and the follower need not be cooperative. Such a game is known as a Stackelberg game.
Stackelberg Games
Let us adopt the typical game theoretic notation in which the player index set is I and x −i = (x j ) j∈I/{i} denotes the joint action profile of all agents excluding agent i. In the Stackelberg case, I = {1, 2} where player i = 1 is the leader and player i = 2 is the follower. We assume throughout that each f i is sufficiently smooth, meaning f i ∈ C q (X, R) for some q ≥ 2 and for each i ∈ I.
The leader aims to solve the optimization problem given by
and the follower aims to solve the optimization problem min x 2 ∈X 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). As noted above, the learning algorithms we study are such that the agents follow myopic update rules which take steps in the direction of steepest descent with respect to the above two optimizations problems, the former for the leader and the latter for the follower. Before formalizing these updates, let us first discuss the equilibrium concept studied for simultaneous play games and contrast it with that which is studied in the hierarchical play counterpart. The typical equilibrium notion in continuous games is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in simultaneous play games and the Stackelberg equilibrium in hierarchical play games. Each notion of equilibria can be characterized as the intersection points of the reaction curves of the players [4] . Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). The joint strategy x * ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ I,
The strategy is a local Nash equilibrium on W ⊂ X if for each i ∈ I,
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). In a two-player game with player 1 as the leader, a strategy x * 1 ∈ X 1 is called a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader if
where R(
This definition naturally extends to the n-follower setting when R(x 1 ) is replaced with the set of Nash equilibria NE(x 1 ), given that player 1 is playing x 1 so that the follower's reaction set is a Nash equilibrium.
We denote by D i f i the derivative of f i with respect to x i and D(·) the total derivative 2 . Denote by
) the vector of individual gradients for simultaneous play and ω S (x) = (Df 1 (x), D 2 f 2 (x)) as the equivalent for hierarchical play where Df 1 is the total derivative of f 1 with respect to x 1 and x 2 is implicitly a function of x 2 which captures the fact that the leader operates under the assumption that the follower will play a best response to its choice of x 1 .
It is possible to characterize a local Nash equilibrium using sufficient conditions for Definition 1.
Definition 3 (Differential Nash Equilibrium [34] ). The joint strategy x * ∈ X is a differential Nash equilibrium if ω(x * ) = 0 and D 2 i f i (x * ) > 0 for each i ∈ I. Analogous sufficient conditions can be stated which characterize a local Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader using first and second order conditions on the leader's optimization problem. Indeed, if Df 1 (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) = 0 and D 2 f 1 (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) is positive definite, then x * 1 is a local Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader. We use these sufficient conditions to define the following refinement of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept.
, where r is implicitly defined by D 2 f 2 (x * 1 , x * 2 ) = 0, is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium for the game (f 1 , f 2 ) with player 1 as the leader if Df 1 (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) = 0, and D 2 f 1 (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) is positive definite.. We utilize these local characterizations in terms of first and second order conditions to formulate the myopic hierarchical learning algorithms we study. Indeed, following the preceding discussion, consider the learning rule for each player to be given by
where recall that ω S = (Df 1 (x), D 2 f 2 (x)) and the notation ω S,i indicates the entry of ω S corresponding to the i-th player. Moreover, {γ i,k } the sequence of learning rates and {w i,k } is the noise process for player i, both of which satisfy the usual assumptions from theory of stochastic approximation provided in detail in Section 3. We note that the component of the update ω S,i (x k ) + w i,k+1 captures the case in which each agent does not have oracle access to ω S,i , but instead has an unbiased estimator for it. The given update formalizes the class of learning algorithms we study in this paper.
2. For example, given a function f (x, y(x)), Df = D1f + D2f ∂y/∂x.
Leader-Follower Timescale Separation. We require a timescale separation between the leader and the follower: the leader is assumed to be learning at a slower rate than the follower so that γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ). The reason for this timescale separation is that the leader's update is formulated using the reaction curve of the follower. In the gradient-based learning setting considered, the reaction curve can be characterized by the set of critical points of f 2 (x 1,k , ·) that have a local positive definite structure in the direction of x 2 , which is
This set can be characterized in terms of an implicit map r, defined by the leader's belief that the follower is playing a best response to its choice at each iteration, which would imply D 2 f 2 (x 1,k , x 2,k ) = 0, and under sufficient regularity conditions the implicit mapping theorem [23] gives rise to the implicit map r : U → X 2 : x 1 → x 2 on a neighborhood U ⊂ X 1 of x 1,k . Formalized in Section 3, we note that when r is defined uniformly in x 1 on the domain for which convergence is being assessed, the update in (1) is well-defined in the sense that the component of the derivative Df 1 corresponding to the implicit dependence of the follower's action on x 1 via r is well-defined and locally consistent. In particular, for a given point
an isomorphism, the implicit function theorem implies there exists an open set U ⊂ X 1 such that there exists a unique continuously differentiable function r : U → X 2 such that r(x 1 ) = x 2 and D 2 f 2 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) = 0 for all x 1 ∈ U . Moreover,
on U . Thus, in the limit of the two-timescale setting, the leader sees the follower as having equilibriated (i.e., D 2 f 2 ≡ 0) so that
The map r is an implicit representation of the follower's reaction curve.
Overview of analysis techniques. The following describes the general approach to studying the hierarchical learning dynamics in (1) . The purpose of this overview is to provide the reader with the high-level architecture of the analysis approach. The analysis techniques we employ combine tools from dynamical systems theory with the theory of stochastic approximation. In particular, we leverage the limiting continuous time dynamical systems derived from (1) to characterize concentration bounds for iterates or samples generated by (1) . We note that the hierarchical learning update in (1) with timescale separation γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ) has a limiting dynamical system that takes the form of a singularly perturbed dynamical system given bẏ
where, in the limit as τ → 0, the above approximates (1). The limiting dynamical system has known convergence properties (asymptotic convergence in a region of attraction for a locally asymptotically stable attractor). Such convergence properties can be translated in some sense to the discrete time system by comparing pseudo-trajectories-in this case, linear interpolations between sample points of the update process-generated by sample points of (1) and the limiting system flow for initializations containing the set of sample points of (1). Indeed, the limiting dynamical system is then used to generate flows initialized from the sample points generated by (1) . Creating pseudo-trajectories, we then bound the probability that the pseudo-trajectories deviate by some small amount from the limiting dynamical system flow over each continuous time interval between the sample points. A concentration bound can be constructed by taking a union bound over all the time intervals after a finite time after which we can guarantee the sample path has entered the region of attraction on which we can produce a Lyapunov function for the continuous time dynamical system. The analysis in this paper is based on the above highlevel idea.
Connections and Implications
Before presenting convergence analysis of the update in (1), we draw some connections to applications domains-including adversarial learning where zero-sum game abstractions have been recently touted for finding robust parameter configurations for neural networks and opponent shaping in multi-agent learningand equilibrium concepts commonly used in these domains. Let us first remind the reader of some common definitions from dynamical systems theory.
Given a sufficiently smooth function f ∈ C q (X, R), a critical point x * of f is said to be stable if for all t 0 ≥ 0 and ε > 0, there exists δ(t 0 , ε) such that
Further, x * is said to be asymptotically stable if x * is additionally attractive-that is, for all t 0 ≥ 0, there exists δ(t 0 ) such that
A critical point is said to be non-degenerate if the determinant of the Jacobian of the dynamics at the critical point is non-zero. For a non-degenerate critical point, the Hartman-Grobman theorem [39] enables us to check the eigenvalues of the Jacobian to determine asymptotic stability. In particular, at non-degenerate critical point, if the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are in the open left-half complex plane, then the critical point is asymptotically stable. The dynamical systems we study in this paper are of the formẋ = −F (x) for some vector field F determined by the gradient based update rules employed by the agents. Hence, to determine if a critical point is stable, we simply need to check that the spectrum of the Jacobian of F is in the open right-half complex plane. For the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x), let J(x) denote the Jacobian of the vector field ω(x). Similarly, for the dynamicsẋ = −ω S (x), let J S (x) denote the Jacobian of the vector field ω S (x). Then, we say a differential Nash equilibrium of a continuous game with corresponding individual gradient vector field ω is stable if spec(J(x)) ⊂ C • + where spec(·) denotes the spectrum of its argument and C • + denotes the open right-half complex plane. Similarly, we say differential Stackelberg equilibrium is stable if spec(J S (x)) ⊂ C • + .
IMPLICATIONS FOR ZERO-SUM SETTINGS
Zero-sum games are a very special class since there is a strong connection between Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria. Proposition 1. Stable differential Nash equilibria in continuous zero-sum games are differential Stackelberg equilibria. That is, given a zero-sum game (f, −f ) defined by a sufficiently smooth function f ∈ C q (X, R) with q ≥ 2, a differential Nash equilibrium x * is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof Consider an arbitrary sufficiently smooth zero-sum game (f, −f ) on continuous strategy spaces. Suppose x is a stable differential Nash equilibrium so that by definition
Then, the Schur complement of J(x) is also positive definite:
Hence, x is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium since the Schur complement of J is exactly the derivative D 2 f at critical points and −D 2 2 f (x) > 0 since x is a differential Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1.
In the zero-sum setting, the fact that Nash equilibria are a subset of Stackelberg equilibria (or minimax equilibria) for finite games is well-known [4] . We show the result for the notion of differential Stackelberg equilibria for continuous action space games that we introduce. It is interesting to point out that for a subclass of zero-sum continuous games with a convex-concave structure for the leader's cost the set of (differential) Nash and (differential) Stackelberg equilibria coincide. Indeed, D 2 1 f (x) > 0 at critical points for convex-concave games, so that if x is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium, it is also a Nash equilibrium.
In recent work on GANs [32] , hierarchical learning of a similar nature proposed in this paper is studied in the context of zero-sum games. Proposition 1 result says two-timescale gradient-based procedures for GANs in which the generator and the discriminator update their parameters following their individual gradients with the generator having a slower timescale lead to Stackelberg equilibria. It is worth studying if the distortion of the vector field from the timescale separation produces more efficient equilibria. Empirically, GANs learned with such procedures seem to outperform gradient descent with uniform stepsizes [32] .
Proposition 2. Consider the class of continuous zero-sum games
is positive definite are differential Stackelberg equilibria and attractors oḟ
Proof Without loss of generality, let −D 2 f 2 (x) > 0. Since x is a stable attractor, the Jacobian J(x) of ω(x) is positive definite. Hence, with the fact that −D 2 2 f (x) > 0, the Schur complement of J(x) is positive definite:
Thus, x is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, since
the Jacobian of the Stackelberg limiting dynamicsẋ = −ω S (x) with player 1 as the leader,
is positive definite. The structure of J S at critical points follows from the fact that
at critical points. This result implies that some of the non-Nash attractors ofẋ = −ω(x) are in fact Stackelberg equilibria which, in the case of GANs, may be desirable equilibria to find as suggested by the success of the techniques and implementation proposed in Metz et al. [32] . This is a surprising result to some extent since recent works such as Mazumdar et al. [27] propose schemes to avoid such attractors because they have been classified or viewed as being undesirable. This further suggests that techniques such as those proposed in Mazumdar et al. [27] requiring strong coordination between players may be relaxed to require less coordination if Stackelberg are acceptable equilibria for the application. Proof The result follows directly from the structure of the Jacobian J S (x).
The result of Proposition 3 implies that with appropriately chosen stepsizes the update rule in (1) will only converge to Stackelberg equilibria and thus, unlike simultaneous play individual gradient descent (known as gradient-play in the game theory literature), will not converge to spurious locally asymptotically stable attractors of the dynamics that are not relevant to the underlying game. This means the hierarchical learning dynamics will not converge to non-Stackelberg equilibria in zero-sum games.
CONNECTIONS TO OPPONENT SHAPING
Beyond the work in zero-sum games and applications to GANs, there has also been recent work, which we will refer to as 'opponent shaping', where one or more players takes into account its opponents' response to their action [15, 24, 43] . The initial work of Foerster et al. [15] bears the most resemblance to the learning algorithms studied in this paper. The update rule (LOLA) considered there (in the deterministic setting with constant stepsizes) takes the following form:
The attractors of these dynamics are not necessarily Nash equilibria nor are they Stackelberg equilibria as can be seen by looking at the critical points of the dynamics. Indeed, the LOLA dynamics lead only to Nash or non-Nash stable attractors of the limiting dynamics. The effect of the additional 'look-ahead' term is simply that it changes the vector field and region of attraction for stable critical points. In the zero-sum case, however, the critical points of the above are the same as those of simultaneous play individual gradient updates, yet the Jacobian is not the same and it is still possible to converge to a non-Nash attractor.
With a few modifications, the above update rule can be massaged into a form which more closely resembles the hierarchical learning rules we study in this paper. In particular, if instead of γ 2 , player 2 employed a Newton stepsize of (D 2 2 f 2 ) −1 , then the update would look like
which resembles a deterministic version of (1). The critical points of this update coincide with the critical points of a Stackelberg game (f 1 , f 2 ). With appropriately chosen stepsizes and with an initialization in a region on which the implicit map, which defines the −(D 2 2 f 2 ) −1 (x)D 12 f 2 (x) component of the update, is well-defined uniformly in x 1 , the above dynamics will converge to Stackelberg equilibria. In this paper, we provide an in-depth convergence analysis and for the stochastic setting 3 of the above update.
COMPARING NASH AND STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM COST
We have alluded to the idea that the ability to act first gives the leader a distinct advantage over the follower in a hierarchical game. We now formalize this statement with a known result that compares the cost of the leader at Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. . Consider an arbitrary sufficiently smooth two-player general-sum game (f 1 , f 2 ) on continuous strategy spaces. Let f N 1 denote the the infimum of all Nash equilibrium costs for player 1 and f S 1 denote an arbitrary Stackelberg equilibrium cost for player 1. Then, if R(x 1 ) is a singleton for every
This result says that the leader never favors the simultaneous play game instead of the hierarchical play game in two-player general-sum games with unique follower responses. On the other hand, the follower may or may not prefer the simultaneous play game over the hierarchical play game.
The fact that under certain conditions the leader can obtain lower cost under a Stackelberg equilibrium compared to any of the Nash equilibrium may provide further explanation for the success of the methods in [32] . Commonly, the discriminator can overpower the generator when training a GAN [32] and giving the generator an advantage may mitigate this problem. In the context of multi-agent learning, the advantage of the leader in hierarchical games leads to the question of how the roles of each player in a game are decided. While we do not focus on this question, it is worth noting that when each player mutually benefits from the leadership of a player the solution is called concurrent and when each player prefers to be the leader the solution is called non-concurrent. We believe that exploring classes of games in which each solution concept arises is an interesting direction of future work.
Convergence Analysis
Following the preceding discussion, consider the learning rule for each player to be given by
where recall that ω S = (Df 1 (x), D 2 f 2 (x)). Moreover, for each i ∈ I, {γ i,k } is the sequence of learning rates and {w i,k } is the noise process for player i. As before, suppose player 1 is the leader and conjectures that player 2 updates its action x 2 in each round via r(x 1 ). This setting captures the scenario in which players do not have oracle access to their gradients, but do have an unbiased estimator. As an example, players could be performing policy gradient reinforcement learning or alternative gradient-based learning schemes. Let dim(
Assumption 1. The following hold: A1a. The maps Df 1 :
A1b. For each i ∈ I, the learning rates satisfy k γ i,k = ∞, k γ 2 i,k < ∞. A1c. The noise processes {w i,k } are zero mean, martingale difference sequences. That is, given the filtration
Before diving into the convergence analysis, we need some machinery from dynamical systems theory. Consider the dynamics from (4) written as a continuous time combined systemξ t = F (ξ t ) where ξ t (z) = ξ(t, z) is a continuous map and ξ = {ξ t } t∈R is the flow of F . A set A is said to be invariant under the flow ξ if for all t ∈ R, ξ t (A) ⊂ A, in which case ξ|A denotes the semi-flow. A point x is an equilibrium if ξ t (x) = x for all t and, of course, when ξ is induced by F , equilibria coincide with critical points of F . Let X be a topological metric space with metric ρ, an example being X = R d endowed with the Euclidean distance.
Definition 5. A nonempty invariant set A ⊂ X for ξ is said to be internally chain transitive if for any a, b ∈ A and δ > 0, T > 0, there exists a finite sequence {x 1 = a, x 2 , . . . , x k−1 , x k = b; t 1 , . . . , t k−1 } with
Learning Stackelberg Solutions for the Leader
Suppose that the leader (player 1) operates under the assumption that the follower (player 2) is playing a local optimum in each round. That is, given x 1,k , x 2,k+1 ∈ arg min x 2 f 2 (x 1,k , x 2 ) for which D 2 f 2 (x 1,k , x 2 ) = 0 is a first-order local optimality condition. If, for a given ( x 2 ) is invertible and D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0, then the implicit function theorem implies that there exists neighborhoods U ⊂ X 1 and V ⊂ X 2 and a smooth map r : U → V such that r(x 1 ) = x 2 .
Assumption 2. For every x 1 ,ẋ 2 = −D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium r(x 1 ) uniformly in x 1 and r :
Consider the leader's learning rule
where x 2,k is defined via the map r 2 defined implicitly in a neighborhood of (x 1,k , x 2,k ).
Proposition
is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Proof This proof follows primarily from using known stochastic approximation results. The update rule in (5) is a stochastic approximation ofẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) and consequently is expected to track this ODE asymptotically. The main idea behind the analysis is to construct a continuous interpolated trajectoryx(t) for t ≥ 0 and show it asymptotically almost surely approaches the solution set to the ODE. Under Assumptions 1-3, results from [9, §2.1] imply that the sequence generated from (5) converges almost surely to a compact internally chain transitive set ofẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). Furthermore, it can be observed that the only internally chain transitive invariant sets of the dynamics are differential Stackelberg equilibria since at any stable attractor of the dynamics D 2 f 1 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) > 0 and from assumption D 2 2 f 2 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) > 0. Finally, from [9, §2.2], we can conclude that the update from (5) almost surely converges to a possibly sample path dependent equilibrium point since the only internally chain transitive invariant sets forẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) are equilibria. The final claim that x 2,k → r(x * 1 ) is guaranteed since r is Lipschitz and x 1,k → x * 1 .
The above result can be stated with a relaxed version of Assumption 2.
2 f 2 is non-degenerate. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds for i = 1 and that x 1,0 ∈ B q 1 (x * 1 ). Then, x 1,k converges almost surely to x * 1 . Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds for i = 2, r(x 1 ) is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium uniformly in x 1 on the ball B q 2 (x * 2 ), and x 2,0 ∈ B q 2 (x * 2 ), then x 2,k → x * 2 = r(x * 1 ). The proof follows the same arguments as the proof of Proposition 5.
Learning Stackelberg Equilibria: Two-Timescale Analysis
Now, let us consider the case where the leader again operates under the assumption that the follower is playing (locally) optimally at each round so that the belief is D 2 f 2 (x 1,k , x 2,k ) = 0, but the follower is actually performing the update x 2,k+1 = x 2,k + g 2 (x 1,k , x 2,k ) where
. The learning dynamics in this setting are then
where
. Suppose that γ 1,k → 0 faster than γ 2,k so that in the limit τ → 0, the above approximates the singularly perturbed system defined bẏ
The learning rates can be seen as stepsizes in a discretization scheme for solving the above dynamics. The condition that γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ) induces a timescale separation in which x 2 evolves on a faster timescale than x 1 . That is, the fast transient player is the follower and the slow component is the leader since lim k→∞ γ 1,k /γ 2,k = 0 implies that from the perspective of the follower, x 1 appears quasi-static and from the perspective of the leader, x 2 appears to have equilibriated, meaning D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0 given x 1 . From this point of view, the learning dynamics (6)- (7) approximate the dynamics in the preceding section. Moreover, stable attractors of the dynamics are such that the leader is at a local optima for f 1 , not just along its coordinate axis but in both coordinates (x 1 , x 2 ) constrained to the manifold r(x 1 ); this is to make a distinction between differential Nash equilibria in agents are at local optima aligned with their individual coordinate axes.
ASYMPTOTIC ALMOST SURE CONVERGENCE
The following two results are fairly classical results in stochastic approximation. They are leveraged here to making conclusions about convergence to Stackelberg equilibria in hierarchical learning settings. While we do not need the following assumption for all the results in this section, it is required for asymptotic convergence of the two-timescale process in (6)- (7).
Assumption 3. The dynamicsẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) have a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Under Assumption 1-3, and the assumption that γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ), classical results imply that the dynamics (6)- (7) converge almost surely to a compact internally chain transitive set T of (8); see, e.g., [9, §6.1-2], [7, §3.3] . Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that stable differential Nash equilibria are internally chain transitive sets since they are stable attractors of the dynamicsξ t = F (ξ t ) from (8).
Remark 2. There are two important points to remark on at this juncture. First, the flow of the dynamics (8) is not necessarily a gradient flow, meaning that the dynamics may admit non-equilibrium attractors such as periodic orbits. The dynamics correspond to a gradient vector field if and only if D 2 (Df 1 ) ≡ D 12 f 2 , meaning when the dynamics admit a potential function. Equilibria may also not be isolated unless the Jacobian of ω S , say J S , is non-degenerate at the points. Second, except in the case of zero-sum settings in which (f 1 , f 2 ) = (f, −f ), non-Stackelberg locally asymptotically stable equilibria are attractors. That is, convergence does not imply that the players have settled on a Stackelberg equilibrium, and this can occur even if the dynamics admit a potential.
Let t k = k−1 l=0 γ 1,l be the (continuous) time accumulated after k samples of the slow component x 1 . Define ξ 1,s (t) to be the flow ofẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 (t), r(x 1 (t))) starting at time s from intialization x s . Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, conditioning on the event {sup k i x i,k 2 < ∞}, for any integer K > 0, lim k→∞ sup 0≤h≤K x 1,k+h − ξ 1,t k (t k+h ) 2 = 0 almost surely.
Proof The proof follows standard arguments in stochastic approximation. We simply provide a sketch here to give some intuition. First, we show that conditioned on the event
Hence the leader's sample path is generated by x 1,k+1 = x 1,k − γ 2,k ζ k which tracksẋ 1 = 0 since ζ k = o(1) so that it is asymptotically negligible. In particular, ( x 2 ) ). That is, on intervals [t j ,t j+1 ] wheret j = j−1 l=0 γ 2,l , the norm difference between interpolated trajectories of the sample paths and the trajectories of (ẋ 1 = 0,ẋ 2 = −D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) vanishes a.s. as k → ∞. Since the leader is trackingẋ 1 = 0, the follower can be viewed as trackingẋ 2 (t) = −D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 (t)). Then applying Lemma 3 provided in Appendix A, lim k→0 x 2,k − r(x 1,k ) → 0 almost surely. Now, by Assumption 1, Df 1 is Lipschitz and bounded (in fact, independent of A1a., since Df 1 ∈ C q , q ≥ 2, it is locally Lipschtiz and, on the event {sup k i x i,k 2 < ∞}, it is bounded). In turn, it induces a continuous globally integrable vector field, and therefore satisfies the assumptions of Benaïm [5, Prop. 4.1] . Moreover, under Assumptions A1b. and A1c., the assumptions of Benaïm [5, Prop. 4.2] are satisfied, which gives the desired result.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 3 and the assumptions of Proposition 6, (x 1,k , x 2,k ) → (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) almost surely conditioned on the event {sup k i x i,k 2 < ∞}. That is, the learning dynamics (6)- (7) converge to stable attractors of (8), the set of which includes the stable differential Stackelberg equilibria.
Proof Continuing with the conclusion of the proof of Proposition 6, on intervals [t k , t k+1 ] the norm difference between interpolates of the sample path and the trajectories ofẋ 1 = −Df 1 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) vanish asymptotically; applying Lemma 3 (Appendix A) gives the result.
Leveraging the results in Section 2.2.1, the convergence guarantees are stronger since in zero-sum settings all attractors are Stackelberg; this contrasts with the Nash equilibrium concept.
Corollary 3. Consider a zero-sum setting (f, −f ). Under the assumptions of Proposition 6 and Assumption 3, conditioning on the event {sup k i x i,k 2 < ∞}, the learning dynamics (6)- (7) converge to a differential Stackelberg equilibria almost surely.
The proof of this corollary follows the above analysis and invokes Proposition 2.
Remark 3. As with Corollary 1, we can relax Assumption 2 and 3 to local asymptotical stability assumptions. In this case, again we would need to assume only that for a given ball B q (x * ) = B q 1 (x * 1 ) × B q 2 (x * 2 ) around a differential Nash equilibrium x * , the dynamicsẋ 2 = −D 2 f 2 (x) have a locally asymptotically stable attractor r(x 1 ) uniformly in x 1 on B q 2 (x * 2 ), the dynamicsẋ 1 = Df 1 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) have a locally asymptotically stable attractor on B q 1 (x 1 ), and that x 0 ∈ B q (x * ).
FINITE-TIME HIGH-PROBABILITY GUARANTEES
While asymptotic guarantees of the proceeding section are useful, high-probability finite-time guarantees can be leveraged more directly in analysis and synthesis, e.g., of mechanisms to coordinate otherwise autonomous agents. In this section, we aim to provide concentration bounds for the purpose of deriving convergence rate and error bounds in support of this objective. The results in this section follow the very recent work by Borkar and Pattahil [8] . We highlight key differences and, in particular, where the analysis may lead to insights relevant for learning in hierarchical decision problems between non-cooperative agents.
Consider a locally asymptotically stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium x * = (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) ∈ X and let B q 0 (x * ) be an q 0 > 0 radius ball around x * contained in the region of attraction. Stability implies that the Jacobian J S (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )) is positive definite and by the converse Lyapunov theorem [39, Chap. 5] there exists local Lyapunov functions for the dynamicsẋ 1 (t) = −τ Df 1 (x 1 (t), r(x 1 (t))) and for the dynamicṡ x 2 (t) = −D 2 f 2 (x 1 , x 2 (t)), for each fixed x 1 . In particular, there exists a local Lyapunov function V ∈ C 1 (R d 1 ) with lim x 1 ↑∞ V (x 1 ) = ∞, and ∇V (x 1 ), Df 1 (x 1 , r(x 1 )) < 0 for x 1 = x * 1 . For q > 0, let V q = {x ∈ dom(V ) : V (x) ≤ q}. Then, there is also q > q 0 > 0 and 0 > 0 such that for < 0 ,
An analogously definedṼ exists for the dynamicsẋ 2 for each fixed x 1 .
For now, fix n 0 sufficiently large; we specify the values of n 0 for which the theory holds before the statement of Theorem 1. Define the event E n = {x 2 (t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t n 0 ,t n ]} wherex 2 (t) = x 2,k + t−t k γ 2,k (x 2,k+1 − x 2,k ) are linear interpolates-i.e., asymptotic pseudo-trajectories-defined for t ∈ (t k ,t k+1 )
The basic idea of the proof is to leverage Alekseev's formula (Thm. 3, Appendix A) to bound the difference between the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories and the flow of the corresponding limiting differential equation on each continuous time interval between each of the successive iterates k and k + 1 by sequences of constants that decay asymptotically. Then, a union bound is used over all time intervals after defined for n ≥ n 0 in order to construct a concentration bound. This is done first for the follower, showing that x 2,k tracks the leader's 'conjecture' or belief r(x 1,k ) about the follower's reaction, and then for the leader.
Following Borkar and Pattahil [8] , we can express the linear interpolates for any n ≥ n 0 asx 2 (t n+1 ) = x 1 (s),x 2 (s) ) ds, Alekseev's formula can be applied to get
In addition, for t ≥ s, Φ 2 (·) satisfies linear systeṁ
with Φ 2 (t, s, x 0 ) = I and x 0 = (x 1,0 , x 2,0 ) and where J 2 the Jacobian of −D 2 f 2 (x 1 , ·). We provide more detail on this derivation in Appendix B.
Given that
; this result follows from standard results on stability of linear systems (see, e.g., Callier and Desoer [11, §7.2, Thm. 33]) along with a bound on . Now, an interesting point worth making is that this analysis leads to a very nice result for the leaderfollower setting. In particular, through the use of the auxiliary variable z, we can show that the follower's sample path 'tracks' the leader's conjectured sample path. Indeed, consider z k = r(x 1,k ), that is, where D 2 f 2 (x 1,k , x 2,k ) = 0. Then, using a Taylor expansion of the implicitly defined conjecture r, we get
2 is the error from the remainder terms. Plugging in x 1,k+1 ,
The terms after −D 2 f 2 are o(1), and hence asymptotically negligible, so that this z sequence tracks dynamics as x 2,k . We show that with high probability, they asymptotically contract, leading to the conclusion that the follower's dynamics track the leader's conjecture.
Towards this end, we first bound the normed difference between x 2,k and z k . Define constants
and
and let τ k = γ 1,k /γ 2,k . Lemma 1. For any n ≥ n 0 , there exists K > 0 such that conditioned on E n ,
Using this bound, we can provide an asymptotic guarantee that x 2,k tracks r(x 1,k ) and a high-probability guarantee that x 2,k gets locked in to a ball around r(x * 1 ). Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and let N be such that γ 2,n ≤ ε/(8K), τ n ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ N . Let n 0 ≥ N and with K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) H n 0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ n 0 + T . Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and let γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ). Given a stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium x * = (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )), the follower's sample path generated by (7) with asymptotically track the leader's conjecture z k = r(x 1,k ) and, given ε ∈ [0, 1), will get 'locked in' to a ε-neighborhood with high probability conditioned on reaching B q 0 (x * ) by iteration n 0 . That is, lettingn = n 0 + T + 1, for some
with β n = max n 0 ≤k≤n−1 e
The key technique in proving the above theorem (which is done in detail in Borkar and Pattahil [8] using results from Thoppe and Borkar [42] ), is taking a union bound of the errors over all the continuous time intervals defined for n ≥ n 0 .
The above theorem can be restated to give a guarantee on getting locked-in to an ε-neighborhood of a stable differenital Stackelberg equilibria x * if the learning processes are initialized in B q 0 (x * ).
Corollary 4. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and suppose that γ 2,n ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ 0. With K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that e −κ 2 (tn−t 0 ) H 0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ T . Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, x 2,k will will get 'locked in' to a ε-neighborhood with high probability conditioned on x 0 ∈ B q 0 (x * ) where the high-probability bound is given in (9) with n 0 = 0.
Given that the follower's action x 2,k tracks r(x 1,k ), we can also show that x 1,k gets locked into an ε-neighborhood of x * 1 after a finite time with high probability. First, a similar bound as in Lemma 1 can be constructed for x 1,k .
Define the eventÊ n = {x 1 (t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t n 0 ,t n ]} where for each t,
is a linear interpolates between the samples {x 1,k },t k+1 =t k + γ 1,k , andt 0 = 0. Then as above, Alekseev's formula can again be applied to get
and Φ 1 is the solution to a linear system with dynamics J 1 (x * 1 , r(x * 1 )), the Jacobian of −Df 1 (·, r(·)), and with initial data Φ 1 (s, s, x 1,0 ) = I. This linear system, as above, has bound Φ 1 (t, s, x 1,0 ) ≤ M 1 e κ 1 (t−1)
Lemma 2. For any n ≥ n 0 , there existsK > 0 such that conditioned onẼ n ,
Using this lemma, we can get the desired guarantees on x 1,k . Indeed, as above, fix ε ∈ (0, 1] and let N be such that γ 2,n ≤ ε/(8K), τ n ≤ ε/(8K), ∀ n ≥ N . Then, for any n 0 ≥ N and K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) H n 0 ≤ ε/(8K), ∀ n ≥ n 0 + T . Moreover, withK as in Lemma 2, let
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and that γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ). Given a stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium x * and ε ∈ [0, 1), x k will get 'locked in' to a ε-neighborhood of x * with high probability conditioned reaching B q 0 (x * ) by iteration n 0 . That is, lettingn = n 0 + T + 1, for some constantsC j > 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , 6},
with η n = max n 0 ≤k≤n−1 e −κ 1 (
An analogous corollary to Corollary 4 can be stated for x 1,k with n 0 = 0; we do not present it to save space.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we show numerical examples to validate our theory.
Stackelberg Duopoly
In Cournot's duopoly model a single good is produced by two firms so that the industry is a duopoly. The cost for firm i = 1, 2 for producing q i units of the good is given by c i q i where c i > 0 is the unit cost. The total output of the firms is Q = q 1 + q 2 . The market price is P = A − Q when A ≥ Q and P = 0 when A < Q. We can assume that A > c i for i = 1, 2. The profit of each firm is
Moreover, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game is q * i = (A + 2c 1 − 3c 2 ) 2 . The key point we want to highlight is that in this game, firm 1's (leader) profit is always higher in the hierarchical play game than the simultaneous play game. We also use it as a simple validation example for our theory. For this problem, we simulate the Nash gradient dynamics and our two-timescale algorithm for learning Stackelberg equilibria to illustrate the distinctions between the Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly models. In this simulation, we select a decaying step-size of γ i,k = 1/k for each player in the Nash gradient dynamics. The decaying step-size is chosen to be γ 1,k = 1/k for the leader and γ 2,k = 1/k 2/3 for the follower in the Stackelberg two-timescale algorithm so that the leader moves on a slower timescale than the follower as required. The noise at each update step is drawn as w i,k ∼ N (0, 10) for each firm. The parameters of the example are selected to be A = 100, c 1 = 5, c 2 = 2. In Figure 1 we show the results of the simulation. Figure 1a shows the production path of each firm and Figure 1b shows the profit path of each firm. Under the Nash gradient dynamics, the firms converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of q * N = (30.67, 33.67) that gives profit of π * N = (944.4, 1114.7). The Stacklberg procedure converges to the unique Stackelberg equilibrium of q * S = (46, 26) that gives profit of π * S = (1048.2, 659.9). Hence as expected the two-timescale procedure converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium and gives the leader higher profit than under the Nash equilibrium.
Location Game on Torus
In this section, we examine a two-player game in which each player is selecting a position on a torus. Precisely, each player has a choice variable θ i that can be chosen in the interval [−π, π]. The cost for each player is defined as . Hence, the ability to play before the follower gives the leader a smaller cost at any equilibrium. The equilibrium the dynamics will converge to depends on the initialization as we demonstrate. For this simulation, we select a decaying step-size of γ i,k = 1/ √ k for each player in the Nash gradient dynamics. The decaying step-size is chosen to be γ 1,k = 1/k for the leader and γ 2,k = 1/k 1/2 for the follower in the Stackelberg two-timescale dynamics. The noise at each update step is drawn as w i,k ∼ N (0, 0.01) for each player. In Figure 2 we show the results of our simulation. The Nash and Stackelberg dynamics converge to an equilibrium as expected. The equilibrium that is converged to depends on the initialization. Since the costs are the same for each player at each equilibrium, the question of which equilibrium the dynamics will reach is not significant in this example. In Figures 2a and 2b , we visualize multiple sample learning paths for the Nash and Stackelberg dynamics, respectively. The black lines depict D 1 f 1 for Nash and Df 1 for Stackelberg and demonstrate how the order of play warps the first-order conditions for the leader and consequently produces equilibria which move away from the Nash equilibria. In Figure 2c we give a detailed look at the convergence to an equilibrium for a sample path. Finally, in Figure 2d , we present the evolution of the cost while learning and demonstrate the benefit of being the leader and the disadvantage of being the follower.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. This class of games broadly pertains to any application in which there is an order of play between the players in the game. However, the problem has not been extensively analyzed in the way the learning dynamics of simultaneous play games have been. Consequently, we are able to give novel convergence results and draw connections to existing work focused on learning Nash equilibria.
We believe our work opens several future directions that are worth investigating. To begin with, we intend to pursue experimenting with GAN's using the two-timescale algorithm we propose to learn more about the empirical performance. Moreover, several works on simultaneous play games have examined how to speed-up convergence by neutralizing rotational components of the dynamics and how to avoid stable attractors that are not game-theoretically meaningful. In future work, we plan to explore such questions in the hierarchical learning formulation we consider. Finally, we are interested in studying limited feedback models and general hierarchical decision problems with the goal of influencing behavior of self-interested agents.
In particular, there exists a local Lyapunov function V ∈ C 1 (R d 1 ) with lim x 1 ↑∞ V (x 1 ) = ∞, and
Then, there is also q > q 0 > 0 and 0 > 0 such that for < 0 ,
An analogously definedṼ exists for the dynamicsẋ 2 for each fixed x 1 . For now, fix n 0 sufficiently large; we specify the values of n 0 for which the theory holds before the statement of Theorem 1. Define the event E n = {x 2 (t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t n 0 ,t n ]} wherē x 2 (t) = x 2,k + t−t k γ 2,k Applying the linear system stability results, we get that Φ 2 (t n ,t n 0 , x 1 (t n 0 ),z(t n 0 ))(z(t n 0 ) − x 2 (t n 0 )) ≤ e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) z(t n 0 ) − x 2 (t n 0 ) .
Each of the terms (a)-(d) can be bound as in Lemma III.1-5 in [8] . The bounds are fairly straightforward using (13) . Now that we have each of these asymptotic pseudo-trajectories, we can show that with high probability, x 2,k and z k asymptotically contract to one another, leading to the conclusion that the follower's dynamics track the leader's belief about the follower's reaction. Moreover, we can bound the difference between each x i,k , usingx i (t i,k ) = x i,k , and the continuous flow x i (t) on each interval [t i,k , t i,k+1 ) for each i = 1, 2 and where t 1,k =t k and t 2,k =t k . These normed-difference bounds can then be leveraged to obtain concentration bounds by taking a union bound across all continuous time intervals defined after sufficiently large n 0 and conditioned on the events E n = {x 2 (t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t n 0 ,t n ]} andÊ n = {x 1 (t) ∈ V q ∀t ∈ [t n 0 ,t n ]}. Towards this end, define H n 0 = ( x 2 (t n 0 − x 2 (t n 0 ) + z(t n 0 ) − x 2 (t n 0 ) ),
t k Φ 1 (t n , s,x 1 (t k ))ds w 1,k+1 , and S 2,n = n−1 k=n 0 t k+1 t k Φ 2 (t n , s, x 1 (t k ),x 2 (t k ))ds w 2,k+1 .
Applying Lemma 5.8 [42] , conditioned on E n , we get there exists some constant K > 0 such that x 2 (t n ) − x 2 (t n ) ≤ Φ 2 (t n ,t n 0 , x 1 ,x 2 (t n 0 ))(x 2 (t n 0 ) − x 2 (t n 0 )) + K S 2,n + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k w 2,k+1 2
Using the bound on the linear system Φ 2 (·), this exactly leads to the bound x 2 (t n ) − x 2 (t n ) ≤ K e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) x 2 (t n 0 ) − x 2 (t n 0 ) + S 2,n + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k w 2,k+1 2 Thus, leveraging Lemma III.1-5 [42] , we obtain the result of Lemma 1 in the main body of the paper, and stated here for easy access.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 1 of main body). For any n ≥ n 0 , there exists K > 0 such that conditioned on E n , x 2,n − z n ≤K S 2,n + e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) H n 0 + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k w 2,k+1 2 + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 τ k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 τ k w 1,k+1 2 .
Lastly, in a similar fashion we can obtain a bound for the leader's sample path x 1,k .
Lemma 5 (Lemma 2 of main body). For any n ≥ n 0 , there existsK > 0 such that conditioned onẼ n , x 1 (t n ) − x 1 (t n ) ≤K S 1,n + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 S 2,k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 τ k + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 γ 2,k w 2,k+1 2 + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 τ k w 1,k+1
2 + e κ 1 (tn−tn 0 ) x 1 (t n 0 ) − x 1 (t n 0 ) + sup n 0 ≤k≤n−1 τ k H n 0 .
To obtain concentration bounds, the results are exactly as in Section IV [8] which follows the analysis in [42] . Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and let N be such that γ 2,n ≤ ε/(8K), τ n ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ N . Let n 0 ≥ N and with K as in Lemma 1, let T be such that e −κ 2 (tn−tn 0 ) H n 0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ n 0 + T .
Using Lemma 4 and Lemma 3.1 [42] , For instance, consider a three player setting where γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ) and γ 2,k = o(γ 3,k ) so that player 1 is the slowest player (hence, the 'leader'), player 2 the second slowest, and player 3 the fastest, the 'leader'. Then similar asymptotic analysis can be applied with the following assumptions. Consideṙ
where we will explicitly define F 3 shortly. Let x <j = (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 ) and x ≥j = (x j , . . . , x N +1 ).
Assumption 4.
There exists a Lipschitz continuous function r 3 (x <3 ) such that for any x, solutions of (17) asymptotically converge to (x <3 , r 3 (x <3 )) given initial data x.
Assumption 5. There exists a Lipschitz continuous function r 2 (x <2 ) such that for any x 3 , solutions of (18) asymptotically converge to (x <2 , r 3 (x <3 )) given initial data (x <2 , x ≥2 ).
Now, define ξ ≥2 (x <2 ) = (r 2 (x <2 ), r 3 (x <2 , r 2 (x <2 ))) for notation simplicity. Let Of course the framework naturally extends to N -followers; a similar framework can be found for reinforcement learning algorithms in normal form games [12] .
C.2 N Simultaneously Play Followers
On the other hand, consider a setting in which the followers play a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous play game and are assumed to have the same learning rate. That is, γ 1,k = o(γ 2,k ) where all N followers use the learning rate γ 2,k and the leader uses the learning rate γ 1,k . The results for this section assume that the follower game has a unique differential Nash equilibrium uniformly in x 1 . . . .
has a globally asymptotically stable differential Nash equilibrium r(x 1 ) uniformly in x 1 with r a L rLipschitz function.
All the results in Section 3 of the main body hold replacing Assumption 2 with the above assumption. This is a somewhat strong assumption, however, N -player convex games that are diagonally strictly convex admit unique Nash equilibria which are attracting [37] .
